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1. Introduction 
This paper develops an R&D-based growth model that features 
international R&D funding and patent collateral. Our purpose is to examine 
how the international borrowing interest rate and the fraction of patent 
collateral will affect innovations and economic growth. This paper is 
motivated by the following two observations. 
Firstly, the financing of business enterprise R&D from abroad is observed 
in OECD data. It is commonly believed that R&D funding is critical for the 
growth effect of R&D investment. In their recent paper, based on empirical 
data, Aghion et al. (2012) find that, by virtue of credit and liquidity 
constraints, R&D is more affected by countercyclical monetary policy than by 
physical investment. To reflect this fact, Chu and Cozzi (2014) set up a 
Schumpeterian growth model that features the cash-in-advance (CIA) 
constraint on R&D investment. A notable specification in their model is that 
R&D entrepreneurs fully fund their activities from the home country. 
However, according to the practical data, OECD (2011, p. 92) documents the 
following statement. “On average, R&D funding from abroad plays quite an 
important role in the funding of business R&D. In the EU, it represented 
around 10% of total business enterprise R&D in 2008. … For Austria, Ireland, 
the Slovak Republic and the United Kingdom, funds from abroad represented 
20% or more of total business enterprise R&D.”1 As is obvious, the Chu and 
Cozzi (2014) specification ignores the fact that R&D companies obtain a 
considerable portion of their R&D funding from abroad.   
 Secondly, the financing of business enterprise R&D is observed to be 
subject to patent collateral. A significant number of empirical studies point 
                                                      
1
 See OECD (2011, p. 92) for the real values of R&D funds from abroad in OECD countries. 
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out that R&D patents often serve as collateral when entrepreneurs issue 
bonds to borrow funds for R&D (see, e.g., Brown et al., 2012; Mann, 2014; 
Hochberg et al., 2014). Based on these empirical findings, it is interesting to 
shed light on how patent collateral provides a vehicle to affect R&D 
investment and economic growth. 
Up till now, to the best of our knowledge, no theoretical analysis has 
been devoted to dealing with international R&D funding and patent collateral 
in an R&D-based model. This paper seeks to fill this gap.2 Two main findings 
emerge from the analysis. First, a rise in the fraction of patent collateral is 
beneficial to both innovations and economic growth. Second, a rise in either 
the foreign interest rate or the fraction of borrowed R&D funding is harmful 
to innovations and economic growth.   
2. The model 
We set up an R&D growth model featuring international R&D funding 
patent collateral in R&D firms. In what follows, we will briefly describe the 
economy’s structure. 
2.1  Households 
Consider an economy that is populated by a large number of identical and 
infinitely-lived households. The lifetime utility of the representative 
household is given by:  
 , (1a) 
                                                      
2 In their open-economy R&D-growth models, Aghion et al. (2005) and Chu et al. (2016) 
build up a distance-to-frontier R&D-based growth model, in which R&D entrepreneurs are 
subject to credit constraints rather than patent collateral constraints. However, these studies 
stress that the backward country’s innovations would make its growth rate converge to the 
leading country’s exogenous growth rate. This paper instead examines how international R&D 
funding and the international borrowing interest rate will affect the endogenous growth rate. 
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where  is the consumption of final goods, and  is the subjective 
discount rate.  The total labor supply of each household is fixed at the level 
. Thus, the household’s budget constraint can be expressed as: 
 ,  (1b) 
where  is the stock of physical capital, (=VA) is the value of equity shares 
(R&D stocks), A is the number of equity shares (i.e., the number of varieties of 
intermediate goods), V is the value of an invented variety,  is the interest 
rate of the home country,   is the rate of dividends,  is the rate of 
capital gain or loss in equity shares,  is the wage rate,3 and  is the 
amount of loans lent to R&D firms. The no-arbitrage condition between 
holding physical capital and equity shares is  
 The usual Keynes-Ramsey rule is: 
 . (2) 
2.2  Final goods  
The domestic final goods  are treated as the numéraire. They are 
produced by competitive firms using labor and a continuum of intermediate 
goods in the form: 
 , (3) 
where  is the labor input in the production of final goods,  represents 
the intermediate goods for , and  is the number of varieties of 
intermediate goods.  
 Let  be the price of . The profit function of the final good firms 
                                                      
3 We assume that workers are perfectly mobile across sectors. This implies that a unified 
wage rate  is present in the domestic economy. 
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can then be written as: 
 , (4) 
Therefore, the conditional demand functions for  and  are: 
 , (5) 
 . (6) 
2.3  Intermediate goods 
There is a continuum of differentiated intermediate goods, and each 
intermediate good firm is owned by a monopolist. Following Romer (1990), 
physical capital is the factor input used to produce intermediate goods, and 
one unit of capital produces one unit of intermediate good.  The production 
function can then be expressed as , where  is the capital input used 
by the type-i intermediate firm. Therefore, the monopolistic profit is 
. Accordingly, the profit-maximizing pricing of the type-i firm is 
which implies that the decisions of all intermediate good firms are 
symmetric. Thus we can drop the notation  for variables . The 
profit function can then be represented as: 
 . (7) 
2.4  R&D 
In the R&D sector, the value of any variety  is equal to 
.   This implies that  follows the no-arbitrage condition: 
 . (8) 
The return on investment in R&D will be equal to the profit from the 
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monopolistic intermediate good firm  plus the capital gain .  In line 
with Romer (1990), the R&D firm hires R&D labor  to produce new 
varieties of the knowledge-driven form , where the parameter  
reflects the R&D productivity.4  
In each period, the R&D firm needs working capital to pay for a fraction 
of the labor costs  in advance, where . The total wage payment for 
the R&D labor is , and hence the R&D firm needs to borrow the amount 
of funds . In this economy, the R&D firm can choose to fund the 
shortage of working capital from both the foreign and home countries. Let  
be the proportion of the shortage of working capital borrowed from foreign 
countries, where . Moreover, to reflect the empirical fact that R&D 
funding from abroad plays quite an important role in the funding of business 
R&D, we assume that the foreign country interest rate is lower than the home 
country interest rate, that is, .5 Therefore, the rational R&D firm tends 
to borrow as much as possible from foreign countries. However, it is not 
possible for the R&D firm to borrow without limit from foreign countries, 
because it should offer the market value of its patents as collateral.  Let  
denote the fraction of the collateral, where .6 The patent collateral 
constraint can then be expressed as:  
                                                      
4 Our analytical results in Section 3 remain unchanged when the R&D firm uses final goods 
to produce new varieties in the lab-equipment form. To save space, the detailed derivations 
are not reported here but are available from the authors upon request.   
5 To simplify our analysis, we assume that the home country is a small open economy, and in 
line with Turnovsky (1996), the foreign interest rate is treated as given. 
6 We consider that R&D firms finance the shortage of working capital by way of international 
borrowings. In line with Hochberg et al. (2014), R&D firms are allowed to issue the venture 
debt to the home country or to foreign countries. We assume that the international funding 
market is an asymmetric information market. Therefore, to avoid lending risk, foreign lenders 
will ask the home country’s R&D firms to provide some collateral.  
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 .  (9) 
Due to , the profit-maximizing R&D firm will choose a value of  such 
that the inequality constraint (9) is binding.7 Accordingly, the remaining 
proportion of the shortage of working capital is funded from the home 
households, i.e., .   
Let  denote the profit of the R&D firm. The R&D firm’s maximization 
problem can be written as: 
 , (10a) 
  and .   (10b) 
The free entry condition for R&D and the optimum condition for  are given 
by: 
 , (11a) 
 . (11b) 
2.5  Market clearing and aggregation 
The market-clearing condition for the labor market is: 
 . (12) 
With its symmetric feature, the market-clearing condition for physical capital 
is expressed as: , where  is the aggregate capital 
demand for all intermediate firms and  is the supply of capital provided 
by the households.  Moreover, the home country’s resource constraint can be 
expressed as . 
                                                      
7 Equation (9) indicates that only the international borrowings of the R&D firm are 
subject to the patent collateral constraint.  Our analytical results are robust when 
domestic borrowings are also subject to the patent collateral constraint. 
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3. Analysis 
Along the balanced growth path, since the allocations of labor and the 
domestic interest rate are stationary, we can infer that both  
and  remain intact at a fixed value. As a result, it is clear that 
 also remains intact at a fixed value, thereby 
implying that  in the steady-state equilibrium.  
From (5), (8), ,8 (11a), and (11b), we have: 
 . (13) 
At the balanced growth equilibrium,  holds. Then, by using
, , and the labor market-clearing condition, 
, we obtain: 
 . (14) 
Substituting (14) into (13) yields: 
 . (15) 
We can solve for two values of  to satisfy (15). One is positive and the other 
one is negative. To make the analysis meaningful, we exclude the negative 
interest rate. Therefore, the reasonable equilibrium value of the domestic 
interest rate is (a tilde over the variable denotes its steady-state value): 
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 Based on equation (6) with the symmetric feature , we have .  Moreover, 
by using (7), the aggregate profits of all intermediate firms can be expressed as
. By inserting  and  into , 
we have . 
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 , (16) 
where . From (2) and (16), we can derive the 
balanced growth rate as follows: 
 . (17) 
Differentiating (17) with respect to , , and  yields the following results: 
 , (17a) 
 , (17b) 
 , (17c) 
where .9 The results in (17a)-(17c) lead us to establish the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 1. A rise in the fraction of the collateral ( ) raises the balanced growth 
rate, while a rise in either the foreign interest rate ( ) or the fraction of borrowed 
R&D labor costs ( ) lowers the balanced growth rate.  
The economic intuition behind Proposition 1 is quite obvious. A higher 
fraction of the collateral ( ) implies that the home country’s R&D firms can 
obtain a larger amount of cheaper funds from foreign countries. This 
encourages the R&D firm to hire more labor, and hence leads to more 
innovations and higher economic growth.  Similarly, in response to a higher 
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foreign interest rate ( ) or a higher fraction of borrowed R&D labor costs ( ), 
the R&D firm is motivated to reduce its R&D labor.  This in turn leads to a 
decline in the home country’s innovations and economic growth. 
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